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United States' Agricultural Protectionism After the
Uruguay Round: What Remains of Measures to
Provide Relief from Surges of Agricultural Imports
Dale E. McNie t
I. Introduction
Increasing imports of agricultural commodities and processed
food products can cause considerable financial harm to domestic
producers and processing industries. For instance, a 162%
increase in imports of wheat gluten since 1993 has left the
domestic wheat gluten industry reeling.' On January 22, 1997, the
U.S. Wheat Gluten Industry Council filed a petition with the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), pursuant to section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, complaining about the depressed
prices of wheat gluten in the domestic market resulting from
various practices of the European Communities (EC). The USTR
commenced an investigation to determine whether EC subsidies
hinder the importation of U.S. modified starches into the EC, but
politely invited the petitioners to seek import relief elsewhere.
The industry then filed a petition under section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974 with the International Trade Commission (ITC).3 On
t Partner, McLeod, Watkinson & Miller, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1976, University
of Chicago Law School. The author previously served as Senior Counsel in the Office
of the General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture, and participated in the
negotiations of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and the NAFTA Chapter
on Agriculture. The views expressed in this article are, of course, solely the views of the
author.
I See Wheat Gluten Industry Files Section 201 Complaint Against EU, THE FooD
AND FIBER LETrER (Sparks Cos., McLean, Va.), Oct. 6, 1997, at 3.
2 See Certain Subsidies Affecting Access to the European Communities' Market
for Modified Starch, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,264-65 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1997) (initiation of § 302
investigation). The investigation was subsequently terminated without resort to dispute
settlement. See Certain Subsidies Affecting Access to the European Communities'
Market for Modified Starch, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,398 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1997) (termination
of § 302 investigation).
3 See Wheat Gluten Industry Council, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,488 (U.S. Int'l Trade
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January 15, 1998, the ITC found that the increased imports of
wheat gluten caused serious injury to the U.S. wheat gluten
industry.
The experience of the U.S. Wheat Gluten Industry Council
illustrates the increasing difficulty agricultural and other industries
may experience when seeking relief from import competition. The
agreements reached under the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994)' have changed many
avenues of protection for farmers and processors from imports of
agricultural products.6 This Article will survey the principal
governmental measures available to producers and processors to
cope with import competition and discuss the impact that the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture has had on these
measures.
Section II of this Article will examine the effect of the GATT
on seeking a modification of tariff bindings on agricultural
imports. Section III will discuss import quotas and the effect of
the GATT-imposed tarriffication on this form of protection.
Section IV will consider the effect of the GATT on the imposition
Comm'n 1997) (institution of § 202 investigation).
4 See ITC Says Increased Imports of Wheat Gluten Injure U.S. Industry, ITC
News Rel. No. 98-002 (Jan. 15, 1998); ITC Finds Gluten Imports Harm U.S. Industry,
THE FOOD AND FIBER LETTER (Sparks Cos., Mc Lean, Va.), Feb. 2, 1998, at 3.
5 The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations was signed on April 15, 1995, at Marrakesh, Morocco. It has three
components, the main one being the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization and its four annexes. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 1 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994). Annex IA to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization contains multilateral agreements on trade in goods-which make up
the "GATT 1994"---as well as a number of side agreements. See Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 20 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The GATT 1994 has five components, including
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947) as amended through
the years, instruments adopted under GATT 1947, and the Understandings contained in
Annex I A of the WTO Agreement. See PHILIP RAWORTH & LINDA C. REIF, THE LAW OF
THE WTO 15-16 (1995).
6 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 5, Annex IA [hereinafter GATT 1994].
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of antidumping duties, and Section V will examine the GATT's
effect on the law of countervailing duties. Section VI will discuss
the availability of escape clause proceedings as an avenue of relief
from agricultural import competition. Section VII will turn to
intellectual property protection for agricultural industries. Finally,
Section VIII will discuss the use of section 301 proceedings to
challenge unfair import practices.
II. Tariffs
The oldest form of import protection is the tariff or import
customs duty. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority
to lay and collect customs duties, provided that they are uniform
throughout the United States.7 However, since 1934, most changes
in tariffs, generally reductions, have been proclaimed by the
President under authority delegated by Congress This authority
is generally invoked to implement the results of multilateral trade
negotiations under the auspices of the GATT in which agreements
have been reached to reduce tariffs. 9
A. GATT TariffRights and Obligations
During various rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, all
tariff rates for imports of agricultural products have been subject to
tariff concessions or "bindings""° under the original General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." Under these provisions, World
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. The States are prohibited from laying duties on
imports or exports without the consent of Congress. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
8 See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 201(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2)
(1994); Trade Act of 1974 § 101(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 211 l(a)(2) (1994); Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1102(a)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 2902(a)(1)(B) (1994).
9 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 6763, 60 Fed. Reg. 1007 (1995) (implementing the
trade agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations).
10 During the Uruguay Round, all unbound tariff rates for imports of agricultural
products were expected to be bound pursuant section L, Part B, paragraph 7 of the Draft
Final Act issued by Arthur Dunkel, then chairman of the Uruguay Round Trade
Negotiation Committee. See GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA/L. 19 (Dec.
20, 1991). These bindings are reflected in the Schedules of Concessions of the various
parties. Many U.S. tariff rates for agricultural imports had been bound in previous
rounds of negotiations.
" See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
19981
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Trade Organization (WTO) Members, including.the United States,
cannot impose any duty higher than that bound in their Schedule
of Concessions on agricultural products imported from other
countries that are Members of the WTO. Also, WTO Members
cannot take any other actions to nullify or impair the benefits of
such tariff concessions."2 In addition, the United States, as a WTO
Member, must accord most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to
imports from all other WTO Members.13 Therefore, it is unlikely
that Congress could be persuaded to increase the tariff for any
agricultural product above the bound rate.
However, GATT tariff bindings can be modified or withdrawn
under the provisions of Article XXVIII of the GATT. Article
XXVIII provides three circumstances under which a WTO
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT 1994 incorporates the original GATT by
reference. See GATT 1994, supra note 6, para. 1. Article II of the GATT provides as
follows:
The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting
party, which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on
their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to
the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt
from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for
therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of
any kind imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those
imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily
required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing
territory on that date.
GATT, supra, art. II, para. 1(b). For good discussions of the GATT legal framework for
tariff concessions, see KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 30-31 (1970); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT 201-17 (1969).
12 For pending WTO disputes regarding nullification or impairment of tariff
concessions, see Japan-Measures Affecting Imports of Pork, WT/DS66 (1997) (file
regarding complaint by the European Communities); European Communities--
Measures Affecting Butter Products, WT/DS72 (1997-1998) (file regarding complaint
by New Zealand); European Communities-Duties on Imports of Grains, WT/DS13
(1995-1997) (file regarding complaint by the United States); United States-Tariff
Increases on Products from the European Communities, WT/DS39 (1996) (file
regarding complaint by European Communities). A searchable database of WTO
documents is currently available via the World Wide Web at
<http://www.wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm>.
13 See, e.g., European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) (panel report). See also
European Communities-Duties on Imports of Rice, WT/DS17/1 (Oct. 11, 1995)
(request for consultations by Thailand).
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Member has a right to withdraw or modify a tariff binding: (1)
"open season" renegotiations, which apply to the withdrawal or
modification of concessions to take effect on the first day of each
3-year period since January 1, 1958;'" (2) "special circumstances"
(or "out-of-season") renegotiations may be authorized by the WTO
General Council "at any time, in special circumstances"; 5 or (3)
"reserved" renegotiations may occur, without prior authorization,
if the Member initiating them notified the General Council during
the previous 3-year period that it was reserving the right to modify
its Schedule for the duration of the following three-year period.'6
If any type of Article XXVIII renegotiations occurs, the
"applicant" WTO Member 7 is required to negotiate with any other
Member with which the concession(s) being modified or
withdrawn was initially negotiated (i.e., the party holding "initial
negotiating rights" or "INRs")'8 and any other Member determined
14 See GATT, supra note 11, art. XXVIII, para. 1. "Open Season" renegotiations
may not be initiated earlier than six months, or later than three months, prior to the end
of a three-year period; thus, the next period for initiating open season renegotiations is
July 1 through September 30, 1999. See id. Ad -art. XXVIII, para. 1, n.3. The "Ad"
articles of GAT are interpretative notes that accompany GATT and are found in Annex
1 to GAT'T. Pursuant to Article XXXIV, "[t]he annexes to this Agreement are hereby
made an integral part of this Agreement." Id. art. XXXIV. Thus, the Interpretative
Notes have the same legal value as the provisions of the Agreement. See GATT,
ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 953 (6th ed. 1994).
15 GATT, supra note 11, art. XXVIII, para. 4. Normally, special-circumstances
renegotiations involving a single item or a very small group of items should be
concluded within 60 days. See id. Ad art. XXVIII, para. 4, n.3. Since special-
circumstances renegotiations require authorization, a request can be blocked by a lack of
consensus, or the WTO may be called upon to mediate a settlement. See id. art. XXVIII,
paras. 4(c)-(d).
16 See id. art. XXVIII, para. 5. Such a reservation applies to the party's entire
schedule rather than to selected items. See Schedules and Customs Administration, Feb.
26, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 218 (1955).
17 The WTO Member initiating the Article XXVIII negotiations must transmit a
notification to the WTO Secretariat for secret transmission to all other Members. See
Procedures for Negotiations Under Article XXVIII, Nov. 10, 1980, GATT B.I.S.D.
(27th Supp.) at 26 (1981). The notification should include the items which will be
modified or withdrawn, the proposed modification, the compensation that the party is
prepared to offer, and statistics on imports for the last .three years in which data are
available. See id. at 26-27.
Is Parties have INRs if they requested the relevant concession(s) in rounds of
request/offer negotiations or if they are deemed to hiave INRs, due to having current
principal supplier status, for purposes of rounds of linear concessions, such as the
1998]
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to have a "principal supplying interest" in the concession.19 The
applicant is also required to consult with any Member determined
to have a "substantial interest 20  in the concession." The
negotiations must "endeavor to maintain a general level of
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less
favourable to trade than that provided for . . . prior to such
negotiations."22 If agreement on compensation cannot be reached
with the Members having negotiating rights, the applicant is
nevertheless free to modify its schedule. In the event of such
Kennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds.
19 Normally, the Council should determine that a party has a principal supplying
interest only if that party "has had, over a reasonable period of time prior to the
negotiations, a larger share in the market of the applicant contracting party than a
contracting party with which the concession was initially negotiated .... ." See GATT,
supra note 11, Ad art. XXVIII, para. 1 n.4. Special rules apply if the applicant has
maintained discriminatory quantitative restrictions or if the concession involves "a major
part of the total exports" of a contracting party. Id. Ad art. XXVIII, para. 1 n.5.
Normally, there is, at most, one party with principal supplier rights. See id. Ad art.
XXVIII, para. I n.4. However, two parties may be determined to have principal supplier
status if they have equal shares (both greater than that of the party with INRs) or if the
concession involves the "major share of total exports" of a party which does not have
the largest share of imports. In addition, the Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XXVIII reached during the Uruguay Round provides that a Member having the
highest ratio of its total exports to the Member modifying a concession that will be
affected by the modification shall also be deemed to have a principal supplier interest.
See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, para. 1, WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex
IA [hereinafter Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII].
20 It has been said that "substantial interest is not capable of a precise definition"
but is intended to cover those contracting parties which have "a significant share" in the
market of the applicant. GATT, supra note 11, Ad art. XXVIII, para. 1, n.7. The
Committee on Tariff Concessions, in July 1985, noted "that the '10 per cent share' rule
had been generally applied for the definition of 'substantial supplier."' GATT,
ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 869 (6th ed. 1994).
21 See GATT, supra note 11, art. XXVIII, para. 1.
22 Id. art. XXVIII, para. 2. The Uruguay Round Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXVIII provides that if an ordinary tariff is converted to a
tariff-rate quota, future trade prospects should be included in the compensation.
Paragraph 6 of the Understanding provides that
future trade prospects should be based on the greater of (1) the average annual
trade in the most recent representative 3-year period, increased by the average
annual growth rate of imports in that same period, or by ten per cent, whichever
is greater; or (2) trade in the most recent year increased by ten per cent
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII, supra note 19, para. 6.
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unilateral action, the Members having negotiating rights and all
Members having substantial supplier interests are entitled to
retaliate by withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions for
the following six months. 3
There is no explicit, general legal authority for the President to
enter into Article XXVII negotiations. However, section 125(c)
of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes limited tariff increases which
could be used to implement an Article XXVI renegotiation of
certain tariff bindings made in the Kennedy or Tokyo Rounds or
previously." This authority, however, cannot be used to modify
the tariff bindings made during the Uruguay Round, when
concessions were made for all tariffs on imported agricultural
products.
Congress can provide the authority to enter into Article
XXVII negotiations through special legislation. For example, in
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress authorized a
renegotiation of tariff bindings on imports of tobacco,2" as a
response to the adverse findings of a GATT panel on the domestic
content legislation for tobacco.26 Following negotiations with a
number of countries, the tariff bindings for imported tobacco were
modified to create a tariff-rate quota.27
The United States has no GATT obligation with respect to
tariff rates applied to imports originating in countries that are not
Members of the WTO. Generally, whether such countries receive
MFN treatment depends on whether there is a bilateral trade
23 See GATT, supra note 11, art. XXVIII, para. 3(a). If agreement is reached with
the contracting parties having negotiating rights, all parties having substantial supplier
interests, if not satisfied, are entitled, for the following 6 months, to retaliate by
withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions. See id. art. XXVIII, para. 3(b).
24 See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1994) (giving the President authority to modify import
duties and other restrictions, in effect on Jan. 1, 1975, as deemed necessary).
25 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 421, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994). '
26 See United States-Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use
of Tobacco, DS44/R (Aug. 12, 1994) (panel report adopted on Oct. 4, 1994), available
in 1994 WL 910938 (G.A.T.T.). The domestic content legislation was popularly known
as the Ford Amendment
27 See Proclamation No. 6821, 3 C.F.R. 71 (1995) (to establish a tariff-rate quota
on certain tobacco, eliminate tariffs on certain other tobacco, and for other purposes).
1998]
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agreement between the United States and the non-Member
country. Some countries, however, are denied MFN status under
the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment28 unless they are
found to provide certain human rights to their citizens or are
granted a waiver by the President. Although the Jackson-Vanik
amendment generally is not designed to afford import relief, it
does have a provision authorizing the increase or imposition of
import duties to prevent market disruption with respect to an
article produced by a domestic industry.29 This provision could be
used to provide relief from imports of agricultural products
originating in China or any other communist country.
B. The WTO Special Safeguards
As a result of the Uruguay Round, non-tariff barriers to
imports of agricultural products were subject to "tariffication" or
the conversion to tariff equivalents, usually tariff-rate quotas. The
Agreement on Agriculture provides for the imposition of special
safeguards3" with respect to imports of agricultural products that
were the subject of tariffication.3" A special safeguard may be
invoked if(l) the volume.of imports32 of a product during any year
28 Trade Act of 1974, subchapter IV, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431-41 (1994) (governing
trade relations with countries not currently receiving nondiscriminatory treatment).
29 See 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1994). "Market disruption" is defined as existing within a
domestic industry "whenever imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an
article produced by such domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or
relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof, to such
domestic industry." Id. § 2436(e)(2)(A).
30 See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 5, para. 1, WTO Agreement,
supra note 5, Annex IA [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture]. Where a special
safeguard is invoked, a WTO Member may not simultaneously invoke the escape clause
provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 3 of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 or the safeguard
under paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards. See id. art. 5, par. 8.
For a current dispute involving the Agreement on Safeguards, see United States-
Safeguard Measure Against Imports of Broom Corn Brooms, WT/DS78 (1997) (file
regarding complaint by Colombia).
31 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 30, art. 5, par. 1. The products
subject to the special safeguard provisions must be identified in a Member's Schedule of
Concessions with the note "SSG." See id.
32 Imports under current and minimum access commitments established as part of a
tariff concession can be counted toward the volume of imports required for invoking the
quantity-based safeguard, but imports under such commitments cannot be assessed any
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exceeds a trigger level,33 or (2) "the price at which imports of that
product [] enter the customs territory of the Member [invoking the
safeguard], as determined on the basis of the c.i.f. import price of
the shipment concerned expressed in terms of its domestic
currency, falls below a trigger price equal to the average
1986 to 1988 reference price34 for the product concerned." '35
The safeguard provisions are quite complex and provide the
additional duty. See id. art. 5, para. 4.
33 See id. The trigger level is based on market access opportunities (defined as
imports as a percentage of the corresponding domestic consumption during the three
preceding years for which data are available). Article 5 specifies trigger levels for the
quantity-based safeguard as follows:
Any additional duty imposed under sub-paragraph 1(a) [Article 5(1)] shall only
be maintained until the end of the year in which it has been imposed, and may
only be levied at a level which shall not exceed one-third of the level of the
ordinary customs duty in effect in the year in vhich the action is taken. The
trigger level shall be set according to the following schedule based on market
access opportunities defined as imports as a percentage of the corresponding
domestic consumption during the three preceding years for which data are
available:
(a) where such market access opportunities for a product are less than or
equal to 10 per cent, the base trigger level shall equal 125 per cent;
(b) where such market access opportunities for a product are greater than
10 per cent but less than or equal to 30 per cent, the base trigger level
shall equal 110 per cent;
(c) where such market access opportunities for a product are greater than 30
per cent, the base trigger level shall equal 105 per cent.
In all cases the additional duty may be imposed in any year where the absolute
volume of imports of the product concerned entering the customs territory of
the Member granting the concession exceeds the sum of (x) the base trigger
level set out above multiplied by the average quantity of imports during the
three preceding years for which data'are available and (y) the absolute volume
change in domestic consumption of the product concerned in the most recent
year for which data are available compared to the preceding year, provided that
the trigger level shall not be less than 105 per cent of the average quantity of
imports in (x) above.
Id. art. 5, para. 4.
34 "The reference price used to invoke the provisions of this [safeguard are], in
general, the average c.i.f. unit value of the product concerned, or otherwise ...an
appropriate price in terms of the quality of the product and its stage of processing." Id.
art. 5, para. 1 n.2. The safeguard must be publicly specified and available to allow other
WTO Members to assess the additional duty that may be levied. See id.
35 Id. art. 5, para. 1(b).
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option of a quantity-based safeguard or a price-based safeguard. 6
A quantity-based safeguard may only be maintained "until the end
of the year in which it has been imposed, and may only be levied
at a level which [does] not exceed one-third of the level of the
ordinary customs duty in effect in the year in which the action is
taken.",3' The level of a price-based safeguard must be set
according to a complex schedule.3' The Agreement on Agriculture
36 Pursuant to Article 5(1) a Member may take recourse to a safeguard if:
(a) the volume of imports of that product entering the customs territory of
the Member granting the concession during any year exceeds a trigger
level which relates to the existing market access opportunity as set out in
[Article 5(4)]; or, but not concurrently:
(b) the price at which imports of that product may enter the customs territory
of the Member granting the concession, as determined on the basis of the
c.i.f. import price of the shipment concerned expressed in terms of its
domestic currency, falls below a trigger price equal to the average
1986 to 1988 reference price for the product concerned.
Id. art. 5, para. 1.
37 Id. art. 5, para. 4.
38 The schedule is as follows:
(a) if the difference between the c.i.f. import price of the shipment expressed
in terms of the domestic currency (hereinafter referred to as the "import
price") and the trigger price as defined under that sub-paragraph is less
than or equal to 10 per cent of the trigger price, no additional duty shall
be imposed;
(b) if the difference between the import price and the trigger price
(hereinafter referred to as the "difference") is greater than 10 'per cent but
less than or equal to 40 per cent of the trigger price, the additional duty
shall equal 30 per cent of the amount by which the difference exceeds 10
per cent;
(c) if the difference is greater than 40 per cent but less than or equal to
60 per cent of the trigger price, the additional duty shall equal 50 per cent
of the amount by which the difference exceeds 40 per cent, plus the
additional duty allowed under (b);
(d) if the difference is greater than 60 per cent but less than or equal to 75
per cent, the additional duty shall equal 70 per cent of the amount by
which the difference exceeds 60 per cent of the trigger price, plus the
additional duties allowed under (b) and (c);
(e) if the difference is greater than 75 per cent of the trigger price, the
additional duty shall equal 90 per cent of the amount by which the
difference exceeds 75 per cent, plus the additional duties allowed under
(b), (c) and (d).
Id. art. 5, para. 5.
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honors contract sanctity" and allows differential treatment for
perishable and seasonal products.40 Heading 9904 of chapter 99 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States (HTS)
identifies the price-based special safeguards in detail and publishes
the rate of additional duty for quantity-based safeguards, which
must be announced by the Secretary of Agriculture.4'
C. Free Trade Areas
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)42
established annual tariff reductions that were supposed to
completely eliminate tariffs on imports from Canada by January 1,
1998. NAFTA also established a similar elimination of all tariffs
on imports from Mexico by January 1, 2008. 4' There is no formal
procedure in the NAFTA for the modification or withdrawal of
these tariff commitments. However, the NAFTA provides for a
temporary duty snapback for imports of certain fresh fruits or
vegetables from Canada." The snapback is administered by the
39 Article 5(3) provides:
Any supplies of the product in question which were en route on the basis of a
contract settled before the additional duty is imposed ... shall be exempted
from any such additional duty, provided that they may be counted in the
volume of imports of the product in question during the following year for the
purposes of triggering [the quantity-based safeguard] in that year.
Id. art. 5, para. 3.
40 See id. art 5, para. 6 (applying the conditions of Article 5(5) "in such a manner
as to take account of the specific characteristics of such products").
41 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNrED
STATES 1997, USITC Publication 3001, ch. 99, heading 9904 (1997) [hereinafter HTS].
42 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
43 See NAFTA, supra note 42, art. 302 & annex 302.2 The decision of the
NAFIA Panel on Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural
Products will permit Canada to permanently continue the imposition of tariff-rate quotas
on imports of U.S.-origin dairy products, poultry, eggs, margarine and barley and related
products. See NAFTA Secretariat, Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin
Agricultural Products, at 62, CDA-95-2008-01 (Dec. 2, 1996) (final report of the panel).
Under the Panel's reasoning, the United States should be similarly entitled to continue to
apply tariff-rate quotas to imports of Canadian-origin dairy products, peanuts, cotton,
sugar and sugar containing products.
" See NAFTA, supra note 42, art. 702, annex 702.1, para. 1 (incorporating, inter
alia, Article 702 of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA)). The fruits
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REO.
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS).45 The NAFTA has an
additional special safeguard for specified products imported from
Canada or Mexico."6 The special safeguard must be in the form of
a tariff-rate quota and the over-quota tariff rate may not exceed the
lesser of the MFN rate as of July 1, 1991 or the current MFN .
The U.S. products covered are seasonal imports of certain
tomatoes (except cherry tomatoes), certain onions and shallots,
eggplants, chili peppers, squash, and watermelons."
The United States and Israel are also parties to a free trade
agreement which provides for the elimination of all customs
duties. 9 Under this agreement, imports of certain perishable
products are subject to a snapback duty administered by the FAS5
D. Tariff Preferences
The United States grants duty-free treatment to imports under
three preferential tariff regimes: the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and the
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA). In various circumstances,
the President can withdraw or limit duty-free treatment under these
agreements. This gives agricultural industries an additional
avenue of relief when unfair or harmful import competition is
coming from a country which is a beneficiary of one of these three
regimes.
and vegetables covered under the FTA snapback provision include certain potatoes,
tomatoes, onions, shallots, leeks, garlic, cabbages, cauliflower, kohlrabi, kale, lettuce,
chicory, carrots, salad beets, salsify, celeriac, radishes, cucumbers, grapes, pears,
quinces, apricots, cherries, peaches, plums, and various other products. See United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 12, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, art. 702, para. 7, 27
I.L.M. 281, 318 (1993).
45 See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1560 (1997).
4 See NAFTA, supra note 42, art. 703, para. 3.
47 See id. The MFN rate is the tariff rate applicable to imports from WTO
Members, except those benefiting from preferential treatment. See generally GATT,
supra note 11, art. I.
48 See NAFTA, supra note 42, annex 703.3, § C.
49 See U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Israel, art. 1, 24
I.L.M. 653,657 (1985).
5o See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1540, subpart B (1997).
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1. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a preferential
tariff arrangement intended to promote the export earnings and
economic development of less-developed countries. Participating
developed countries attempt to achieve these goals by giving
imports from these less-developed nations an exemption from the
ordinary (MFN) customs duties." Under the GSP, the President
may provide duty-free treatment for "any eligible article from any
beneficiary developing country." 2  Subject to specified
procedures, criteria, and exceptions, the President is authorized to
designate "eligible articles" and "beneficiary developing
countries." 3
The President may withdraw, suspend, or limit the application
of the duty-free treatment accorded with respect to any article or
with respect to any country. 4 However, the President may not
impose a rate of duty other than that which would apply without
GSP treatment.5 In taking such action, the President is required to
consider a number of statutory factors which include "the
anticipated impact of [duty-free treatment] on United States
producers of like or directly competitive products. 56  The
President is authorized to withdraw an agricultural product from
the list of eligible articles and to withdraw duty-free treatment
from a specific article from a particular country.57 The USTR has
51 See Generalized System of Preferences, June 25, 1971, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th
Supp.) at 24 (1972). The GSP was introduced at the Second United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). On June 5, 1971, the contracting parties of the
GATT granted a waiver from the MFN obligations of Article I to permit developed
contracting parties to accord preferential tariff treatment to products originating in
developing countries and territories on a "generalized, non-discriminatory, and non-
reciprocal" basis. Id. at 25.
52 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994). In the United States, the GSP was established by Title
V of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994)).
53 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
54 See Trade Act of 1974 § 504(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2464(a)(1) (1994).
55 See id.
56 Id. § 2461(3).
57 See Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Sunburst Farms, Inc. v. United States, 797 F.2d 973 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (following
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administrative responsibility for the GSP5
2. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) was
enacted to promote economic revitalization and facilitate
expansion of economic opportunities in the Caribbean Basin
region." Among other things, the CBERA authorizes the
President to proclaim duty-free treatment for all eligible articles
from any beneficiary country. Subject to specified criteria and
exceptions, the President is authorized to designate beneficiary
countries from a list of eligible countries.6 By contrast, unless
excluded by statute from eligibility,6' duty-free treatment applies to
"any article which is the growth, product, or manufacture of a
beneficiary country" if the article is "imported directly from a
beneficiary country into the customs territory of the United States"
and the sum of "the cost or value of the materials produced in a
beneficiary country" or countries plus "the direct costs of
processing operations performed in a beneficiary country or
countries is not less than 35 per centum of the appraised value of
[the] article at the time it is entered" for customs clearance. 62
Under the CBERA, the President generally may withdraw or
suspend the designation of a beneficiary country or withdraw,
suspend, or limit the application of duty-free treatment for any
Florsheim). The court in Florsheim also concluded that the President is at liberty to
consider factors other than those specified in the Act and noted that the President could
limit preferential treatment by setting a quota for the number of articles which will be
permitted to enter the United States duty-free. See Florsheim, 744 F.2d at 795.
58 Any interested party can request that additional articles be designated eligible or
that duty-free treatment eligibility be withdrawn from currently eligible articles. See 15
C.F.R. § 2007.0(a) (1997).
59 See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (1994)).
60 See 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994). The countries currently designated are Antigua
and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the British Virgin Islands. See
HTS, supra note 41, General Note 7(a).
61 See id. General Note 7(d). Excluded products include certain beef or veal,
sugars, sirups or molasses, textile, and apparel articles. See id.
62 Id. General Note 7(b)(i).
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article of a country only if he or she determines that as a result of
changed circumstances the country would be barred from
designation under the statutory criteria.63 The President has no
general authority under the CBERA to remove specific articles
from eligibility for duty-free treatment,6" but if a petition is filed
with the ITC for escape clause relief with respect to a perishable
product,65 the President may, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture," suspend duty-free treatment on an
emergency basis pending the ITC's final action.67
3. The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)
The ATPA is very similar to the CBERA in that articles
originating in designated beneficiary countries68 are entitled to
duty-free treatment.6' Like the CBERA, there is no procedure
short of amending the legislation that could permanently withdraw
duty-free treatment for a specific commodity or product.7"
However, ATPA is also like the CBERA in that when a petition is
filed with the ITC for escape clause relief with respect to imports
of a perishable product, the President, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Agriculture,7 may suspend duty-free treatment
on an emergency basis.7"
63 See 19 U.S.C. § 2702(e) (1994).
64 Duty-free treatment of imports from CBI countries can be withdrawn in
connection with "escape clause" actions under § 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2251-54 (1994), or national security safeguards under § 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1862-64 (1994).
65 Perishable products include certain live plants, fresh or chilled vegetables, fresh
mushrooms, fresh fruits, fresh cut flowers and concentrated citrus fruit juice. See 19
U.S.C. § 3203(e)(5) (1994).
66 See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1540, subpart A (1997).
67 See 19 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (1994).
68 The countries are Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru. See id. § 3202(b)(1).
69 See id. § 3201.
70 Duty-free treatment is limited to 10 years from December 4, 1991. See id. §
3206.
71 See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1540, subpart C (1997).
72 See 19 U.S.C. § 3203(e) (1994) (authorizing emergency relief with respect to
perishable products).
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III. Import Quotas
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the United States maintained
import quotas on a variety of agricultural products. Quotas on
imports of certain dairy products, sugar-containing products,
peanuts and cotton had been imposed pursuant to the provisions of
section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 73 Section
22 provided for the imposition of fees or quantitative restrictions
on imported articles whenever the President 4 found that such
articles were being imported, or were practically certain to be
imported into the United States, under such conditions and in such
quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially
interfere with, certain United States Department of Agriculture
programs or operations with respect to any agricultural commodity
or product, or as to reduce substantially the amount of any product
processed in the United States from a commodity or product
included in such programs or operations." The United States
obtained a waiver for such measures under the provisions of the
GATT 1947.76 During the Uruguay Round, the United States
73 See Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, § 22, as added Aug. 24, 1935, ch. 641, 49 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1994)).
74 The President is instructed to act on the advice of the Secretary of Agriculture
and after an investigation by the United States International Trade Commission. See 7
U.S.C. § 624 (1994).
15 See id. § 624(b). Whenever a condition existed requiring emergency treatment,
the President was authorized immediately to take temporary action without awaiting the
recommendation of the International Trade Commission. See Act of May 12, 1933, ch.
25, § 22, as added Aug. 24, 1935, ch. 641, 49 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 624 (1994)). Currently, under 7 U.S.C. § 624, the President has the authority to set
quotas in order to encourage the exportation and domestic consumption of designated
agricultural products, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 612c (1994), or for products that interfere
with the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 590a-590q
(1994). See 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1994).
76 See Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection with Import Restrictions
Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act (of 1933),
as amended, Mar. 5, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd Supp.) at 32 (1955); see also United
States-Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products
Applied Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff
Concessions, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 228 (1990) (regarding EEC
complaint about U.S. sugar quotas). For a discussion of the waiver, see DAM, supra
note 11, at 260. For a general discussion of waivers under Article XXV of the GATT
1947, see JACKSON, supra note 11, at 541-52.
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agreed to convert these quotas to tariff-rate quotas and agreed to
the termination of the section 22 waiver. Congress amended
section 22 to preclude its application to products of WTO
Members."
Imports of raw and refined sugar also had been subject to an
absolute quota pursuant to a "headnote" in the Tariff Schedules of
the United States (TSUS) which was based on identical notes in
the United States' GATT Schedule.78 In 1989, a GATT dispute
settlement panel determined that the sugar quota was inconsistent
with the GATT's general ban on quantitative restrictions."
President Bush responded to this decision by converting the sugar
quota into a tariff-rate quota in order to bring the United States
into conformity with its GATT obligations." The tariff-rate quota
was re-tariffied during the Uruguay Round, producing slightly
different tariff rates, a commitment on a minimum quota amount,
and separate tariff-rate quotas for raw sugar and refined sugar.8
Another example of tarriffication involved the Meat Import
Act, which formerly provided for the imposition of quotas on
imports of beef.2 The quotas, which were seldom imposed, were
converted to tariff-rate quotas 3 during the Uruguay Round
negotiations, and the statute was repealed.
Article 4.2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
prohibits WTO Members from maintaining, resorting to or
reverting to any of the kinds of non-tariff measures which were
7 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 401, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994).
78 See U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Assoc. v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 402-03 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
79 See United States--Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, June 22, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 331 (1990).
80 See Proclamation No. 6139, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990).
81 See HTS, supra note 41, ch. 17, Additional U.S. Note 5(a)(i), as modified by
Proclamation No. 6763, 60 Fed. Reg. 1007 (1995).
92 See An Act to Provide for the Free Importation of Certain Wild Animals, and to
Provide for the Imposition of Quotas on Certain Meat and Meat Products, Pub. L. No.
88-842, 78 Stat. 594 (1964).
83 See HTS, supra note 41, ch. 2, Additional U.S. Note 3.
84 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 403, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4959 (1994).
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required to be converted into tariffs during the tariffication
process.3 A footnote to the provision lists the prohibited measures
as follows:
These measures include quantitative import restrictions,
variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary
import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-
trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and similar
border measures other than ordinary customs duties, whether or
not the measures are maintained under country-specific
derogations from the provisions of the GATT 1947, but not
measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or
under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of the
GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in
Annex 1A to the MTO. 6
The list is a comprehensive list of non-tariff barriers. Because of
this provision, it is unlikely that Congress or the President could
be persuaded to resort to a listed non-tariff barrier to restrict
harmful imports of an agricultural product.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, directly seeking a tariff
modification or a non-tariff barrier is a difficult endeavor. GATT
and the recent Uruguay Round have imposed substantial barriers
to these avenues of protection. Thus, an agricultural industry
being injured by import competition should consider other avenues
of protection, including antidumping duties and countervailing
duties.
IV. Antidumping Duties
The antidumping duty law87 has been the trade law most
frequently invoked to curb "unfair" imports and perhaps the most
controversial.88 Originally enacted in 1916 to curb predatory
pricing,89 the law has been supplemented and revised many times.9
85 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 30, art. 4, para. 2.
86 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 30, art. 4, n. 1.
87 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673h, 1675, 1677, 1677a-1677n (1994).
88 See, e.g., Greg Mastel, Dumping Safeguards: A New Look, J. COM., Sept. 24,
1997, at 6A (discussing the importance of antidumping law and the improvements made
in this area of law during the Uruguay Round).
89 See Revenue Act of 1916 § 801, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 798 (1916).
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Dumping has two elements: (1) a class or kind of foreign
merchandise is being, or is likely to be, "dumped" or sold in the
United States "at less than fair value,"'" and (2) a domestic
industry has suffered material injury, or been threatened with
material injury, as a result of the dumped imports.9 If dumping is
found to have caused or threatened to cause material injury,
antidumping duties equal to the dumping margin are imposed on
imports in addition to the normal customs duties.93
Dumping cases are generally initiated by the petition of
domestic producers. "  In order for antidumping duties to be
imposed, the International Trade Administration (ITA) in the
Department of Commerce must first find that dumping has
occurred. The ITC then must determine that the dumped imports
have caused, or threatened to cause, material injury to a competing
domestic industry.95  Both agencies make preliminary
90 See Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, 42 Stat. 9, 11 (1921); Trade Act of 1974
§ 1, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1994); Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 101, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
93 Stat. 150, 162 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994)); Uruguay Round
Agreements Act tit. II, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4842 (1994).
91 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(l)(A) (1994). Normally, a sale "at less than fair value,"
consists of a sale for export to the United States at a price less than the comparable price
in the home country market, but there are circumstances where the appropriate
comparison is to sales in a third country market or the cost of production of the goods.
See id.
92 See id. § 1673b(a)(1). The causation element is expressed in the statute in terms
of the injury occurring "by reason of' the imports. Id. § 1673b(a)(1)(B).
91 See id. § 1673. Because dumping can vary from company to company,
antidumping duties are imposed on a company-specific basis. See 19 C.F.R. §
353.20(a)(2)(ii) (1997) (requiring calculation of a weighted-average dumping margin for
each person investigated). The International Trade Administration (ITA) must calculate
the dumping margin on each particular entry. See HARVEY KAYE ET AL., 1
INTERNATiONAL TRADE PRACTICE § 21.02, at 21-2 (1987). Periodically, the ITA conducts
administrative reviews of antidumping duties. See Patrick F.J. Macrory, Administration
of the U.S. Antidumping Law by the Department of Congress, in THE GATT, THE WTO
AND THE URUGUAY RouND AGREEMENTS ACT: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGES 9, 27-31 (Harvey M. Applebaum & Lyn M. Schlitt eds., 1995) [hereinafter
THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT]. See also, e.g.,
Fresh Garlic From the People's Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,082 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1997) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review and partial
termination of administrative review).
94 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (1994) (setting petition requirements).
91 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994). Usually, dumping
consists of selling for export at a price less than the home market price of comparable
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determinations.9 Whether or not the preliminary findings are
positive, the agencies issue final determinations after completing
their investigations. If the final determination of either the ITA or
the ITC is negative, the entire investigation is terminated. 97
The GATT condemns
dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into
the commerce of another country at less than the normal value
of the products ... if it causes or threatens material injury to an
established industry in the territory of a contracting party or
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry."
Article VI: 1 also provides a'definition of dumping as follows:
A product is to be considered as being introduced into the
commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value,
if the price of the product exported from one country to another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course
of trade, for the like product when destined for
consumption in the exporting country, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like
product for export to any third country in the
ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the
country of origin plus a reasonable addition for
selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in
conditions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for
other differences affecting price comparability.9
goods, but other tests are also used. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.41-353.60 (1997).
96 Normally, the ITC has 45 days to determine whether there is a "reasonable
indication" of material injury, and the ITA must issue its preliminary determination of
dumping within 140 days. See Macrory, supra note 93, at 18-20.
97 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2) (1994).
98 GATT, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 1. For a detailed discussion of the GATT
provisions on antidumping duties, see DAM, supra note 11, at 167-77; JACKSON, supra
note 11, at 401-24.
99 GATT, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 1. For applications of Article VI: 1, see
Swedish Antidumping Duties, Feb. 23, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 81 (1955);
Exports of Potatoes to Canada, Nov. 16, 1962, GATT B.I.S.D. (11th Supp.) at 88
(1963).
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The GATT authorizes the imposition of an antidumping duty
"not greater in amount than the margin of dumping" on dumped
products.'0° It also prohibits imposing antidumping duties on
products exempted from, or receiving rebates of, duties or taxes
borne by the like domestic product destined for domestic
consumption.'"" Subjecting an imported product to both
antidumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same
situation of dumping or export subsidization is prohibited. 2
Finally, a contracting party may not impose an antidumping duty
"unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or
subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten
material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to
retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry.'0 3
An antidumping code adopted in 1967 purported to interpret
the antidumping provisions of the GATT °4  These provisions
were only applicable to the trade of the signatories. During the
Uruguay Round, another international agreement on antidumping
measures was reached. 5 Congress amended the antidumping duty
law to implement the antidumping agreement reached during the
Uruguay Round.' ° The amendments relate to minimum standing
requirements," higher de minimis thresholds,' and sunset of
100 GATT, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 2.
101 See id. art. VI, para. 4.
102 See id. art. VI, para. 5.
103 Id. art. VI, para. 6.
104 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, L/2812 (1967), reprinted in JACKSON, supra note 11, at 426-38.
105 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex IA
[hereinafter Agreement on Implementation of Article VI].
106 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
107 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) (1994) (setting time limits on filings and specifying
who can file). In order for a petition to be deemed to havebeen filed by or on behalf of
the industry, the U.S. petitioners must represent at least 25% of domestic production of
the relevant product, and the U.S. producers or workers supporting the petition must
account for "more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like product
produced by that portion of the industry expressing support for or opposition to the
petition." Id. § 1673a(c)(4)(A).
108 See id. § 1673b(b)(3). Dumping margins of less than two percent ad valorem are
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antidumping orders. 1°' However, the Uruguay Round is not
viewed as having caused a substantial change in U.S. antidumping
law or practice. "
V. Countervailing Duties
The U.S. countervailing duty law"' is very similar to the
antidumping duty law in that it provides for import duties to
prevent imports at unfairly low prices. Countervailing duties are
additional duties imposed to offset the benefits of a subsidy
received by an imported product that has caused or threatened to
cause material injury to the domestic producers of a like product.
The countervailing duty law attempts to create a level playing field
by counteracting foreign government export and domestic
subsidies. The United States uses countervailing duties far more
frequently than any other country."
2
The genesis of the countervailing duty law is found in the
McKinley Tariff Act of 1890."' In return for the tariff rate for
imported raw sugar being dropped to zero, the sugar beet
producers were given a 20 per pound "bounty" to counteract
not subject to antidumping duties. See id. In addition, if it is preliminarily determined
that imports are negligible, the investigation must be terminated. See id. § 1673b(a).
Generally, the imports under investigation are considered negligible if they represent
less than three percent of the volume of all imports of the product in the previous 12
months. See id. § 1677 (24)(A)(i).
'09 See id. § 1675(c). The ITA and ITC must conduct sunset reviews within five
years of the imposition of an antidumping duty to assess the impact of its revocation.
See, e.g., Fresh Garlic From the People's Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,082 (Int'l
Trade Admin. 1997) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review and partial
termination of administrative review).
'"0 See Lyn M. Schlitt, Uruguay Round Agreements Act Amendments to the Injury
Provisions of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, in THE GATT, THE WTO
AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note 93, at 403, 405; Paul C.
Rosenthal & Kathleen W. Cannon, Changes to the Injury Provisions of the U.S. Trade
Laws Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note 93, at 415, 417.
"I See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h, 1675, 1677 to 1677-2, 1677c-1677f, 1677g-
1677h, 1677j (1994).
112 See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECu, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GAll TO WTO 184-87 (1995) (discussing
countervailing duties generally).
"13 McKinley Tariff Act § 1, ch. 1244, sched. E, 26 Stat. 567, 583-85 (1890)
(schedule regarding sugar).
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foreign sugar subsidies plus a 1/10 per pound "additional" import
duty on refined sugar imported from countries paying bounties on
sugar exports. 114  The Tariff Act of 1897 made countervailing
duties applicable to all subsidized imports that were subject to
U.S. tariffs."5
The material injury criterion was not adopted until the
conclusion of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations
in 1979, '16 and then it only applied with respect to imports from
countries that were signatories to the Tokyo Round "Subsidies
Code.""' The Uruguay Round "Subsidies Agreement""' 8 made the
material injury test applicable to imports from all countries that are
Members of the WTO." 9
The ITA and the ITC perform comparable functions to their
roles in antidumping duty cases, with the ITA making preliminary
and final determinations on the issue of whether the imports
benefited from a subsidy and the ITC determining whether the
relevant domestic industry has suffered material injury.'20
Countervailing duties are in effect for live swine from Canada,
21
sugar from the EC, 22 and certain pasta from Turkey.'
23
Article VI of the GATT provides some discipline on the
imposition of countervailing duties. 24 Article VI:3 provides as
"4 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 93, § 13.04, at 13-17.
"1 See id. § 13.06, at 13-10.
116 Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 101, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 150, 162
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994)).
"1 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, art. 3, THE TEXTS OF THE
TOKYOROUND AGREEMENTS 127, 129-31 (1986).
118 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 5, Annex IA.
"9 See id. art. 15.
120 See TariffAct of 1930 §§ 701-06, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1671a-1671e (1994).
121 See Live Swine from Canada, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,087 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1997)
(final results of countervailing duty administrative review).
2 See Sugar from the European Community, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,237 (U.S. Treas.
Dep't 1978) (final countervailing duty determination).
123 See Certain Pasta from Turkey, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,546 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1996)
(notice of countervailing duty order).
124 See generally DAM, supra note 11, at 177-79; JACKSON, supra note 11, at 424-
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follows:
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
another contracting party in excess of an amount equal to the
estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted,
directly or indirectly, on-the manufacture, production or export
of such product in the country of origin or exportation,
including any special subsidy to the transportation of a
particular product. The term "countervailing duty" shall be
understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of
offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or
indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any
merchandise."'
Article VI:4 also exempts border tax adjustments from
countervailing duties as well as antidumping duties. 2 6 Article
VI:6 generally requires, subject to grandfathering and some
complex exceptions, that WTO Members refrain from imposing
countervailing duties if the subsidized imports are not resulting in
material injury.2 7
Part V of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (the "Subsidies Agreement")'28 provides
some detailed limitations on the use of countervailing duties. The
Subsidies Agreement includes rules regarding the initiation of
investigations and rules of evidence, 29 calculation of the subsidy, 130
determination of injury and definition of domestic industry, 3 ' and
a new sunset provision which calls for the termination of
125 GATT, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 3; see also United States--Countervailing
Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, July 11, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D.
(38th Supp.) at 45 (1991) (finding that U.S. countervailing duties on pork levied against
Canada were inconsistent with Article VI:3 of GATT).
126 See GATT, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 4.
127 See id. art. VI, para. 6(a).
128 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 5, Annex IA [hereinafter Subsidies Agreement]. For a good
discussion of the negotiation of the agreement, see JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 70-76, 200-07, 301-04
(1995).
129 See Subsidies Agreement, supra note 128, arts. 11 & 12.
130 See id. art. 14.
131 See id. arts. 15 & 16.
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countervailing duties after five years unless they are found to be
needed to prevent a continuation or recurrence of subsidization
and injury.132
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, certain
non-trade distorting domestic subsidies (i.e., those permitted
policies in the so-called "green box") are non-actionable subsidies
for purposes of countervailing duties. 33 For example, in its
administrative review of the countervailing duty on live swine
imported from Canada, the ITA considered whether certain
domestic support measures by Quebec were entitled to the "green
box" exemption. 34  In addition, the Agreement on Agriculture's
so-called "peace clause" calls for "due restraint" to be exercised in
initiating countervailing duty actions against imports benefiting
from domestic subsidies or export subsidies so long as the WTO
Member providing the subsidy is within the Member's reduction
commitments. 
35
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act amended the
countervailing duty law to make the material injury test applicable
to imports from all WTO Members, 36 and to implement the
procedural changes previously discussed with respect to
132 See id. art. 21.
133 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 30, para. 13(a)(i).
134 See Live Swine from Canada, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,460, 47,461-62 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1996) (preliminary results of countervailing duty administrative review).
135 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 30, art. 13, paras. b(i) & c(i). The
peace clause also exempts agricultural export subsidies from the ban on such subsidies
in the Subsidies Code and exempts domestic subsidies from certain challenges under the
Subsidies Code if the domestic support for the specific commodity does not exceed that
provided during the 1992 marketing year. See id. art. 13, paras. b(ii) & c(ii).
136 Prior to the Tokyo Round, U.S. countervailing duty law did not contain a
material injury element. In 1979, Congress added a new countervailing duty law with an
injury test, but the law only applied to imports from countries that were signatories to
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, unless the country entered into a bilateral agreement
with the United States that provided substantially equivalent obligations or that required
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)-(b) (1994); Mark
D. Herlach & David A. Codevilla, Major Changes in U.S. Countervailing Duty Law: A
Guide to the Basics, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS
ACT, supra note 93, at 53, 73-76; Terrence P. Stewart, The Countervailing Duty Law
and the Subsidies Code: A Domestic Counsel's Perspective, in THE GATT, THE WTO
AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note 93, at 263, 265.
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antidumping duty cases. 137
VI. The "Escape Clause"
The imposition of an antidumping duty or a countervailing
duty requires that the ITA find that dumping or a subsidy exists.
In situations where harmful import competition is not the result of
dumping or a subsidy, an agricultural industry may consider
pursuing "escape clause" proceedings which require only a
showing of serious injury. The purpose of an escape clause is to
allow a country to temporarily retreat from negotiated tariff
concessions which have resulted in serious harm to its domestic
industry.' 38 Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. escape
clause, authorizes the President to increase existing duties, impose
additional duties or a tariff-rate quota, or to take other actions13 1
whenever an article is being imported in such increased
quantities'4' as to be a substantial cause,'4' or a threat thereof, of
serious injury' 4 to the domestic industry'43 producing an article
like or directly competitive with the imported article.'" The
statute authorizes provisional relief in the case of imports of a
perishable agricultural product 45 or citrus product.'" The escape
137 See Schlitt, supra note 110; Rosenthal & Cannon, supra note 110.
138 See Harvey M. Applebaum & David R. Grace, Section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY RoUND AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note
93, at 519, 521.
'31 See 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3). The statute authorizes the imposition of
quantitative import restrictions and voluntary export restraints, but these would violate
U.S. obligations under Article 4.2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.
141 An increase can be in terms of actual volumes or relative to domestic
production. See id. § 2252(c)(1)(C).
141 "Substantial cause" is defined as "a cause which is important and not less than
any other cause." Id. § 2252(b)(l)(B).
142 "Serious injury" is defined as "a significant overall impairment in the position of
a domestic industry." Id. § 2252(c)(6)(C).
'3 Domestic industry is defined as "the producers as a whole of the like or directly
competitive article or those producers whose collective production of the like or directly
competitive article constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of
such article." Id. § 2252(c)(6)(A)(i).
1' See id. §§ 2252-54 (setting out methods for investigating claims, making
determinations, defining response options, and monitoring the offender).
145 See id. § 2252(d)(l)(B). A "perishable agricultural product" is defined as:
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clause is administered by the USTR and the ITC. 47 Petitioners are
expected to present an adjustment plan to facilitate positive
adjustment to import competition. 14 s
The escape clause is rarely invoked and even then is often not
successful, generally because of the difficulty in proving that
imports have caused the domestic industry's decline. In March
1995, Florida tomato growers requested provisional escape clause
relief from imports of fresh winter tomatoes from Mexico. After
intensive negotiations with the government of Mexico and the
Mexican tomato industry, the petition was withdrawn and the
investigation was terminated without any relief being imposed.49
One recent case, however, illustrates that the escape clause can be
successfully invoked. In September 1997, the U.S. wheat gluten
industry filed a section 201 petition for increased import duties on
wheat gluten from the European Union.'" The ITC has found
serious injury in this case and will recommend relief for the U.S.
wheat gluten industry. 5'
The use of an escape clause is permitted by Article XIX of the
GATT.' During the Uruguay Round, a Safeguards Agreement
any agricultural article, including livestock, regarding which the Trade
Representative considers action under this section to be appropriate after taking
into account (i) whether the article has (I) a short shelf life, (II) a short growing
season, or (III) a short marketing period, (ii) whether the article is treated as a
perishable product under any other Federal law or regulation; and (iii) any other
factor considered appropriate by the Trade Representative.
Id.
146 See id. § 2252(d). "Citrus product" is defined as "any processed oranges or
grapefruit, or any orange juice or grapefruit juice, including concentrate." Id. §
2252(d)(5)(A).
147 See 19 C.F.R. pt. 206, subpart B (1997).
148 See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 138, at 523. Such positive adjustment
plans are not mandatory. See id.
19 See Fresh Winter Tomatoes, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,248 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1995)
(termination of investigation).
Iso See U.S. Wheat Gluten Producers File Section 201 Complaint Against EU, 14
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1630 (Sept. 24, 1997). For a discussion of the history of this
case, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
151 See ITC Says Increased Imports of Wheat Gluten Injure U.S. Industry, ITC
News Rel. No. 98-002 (Jan. 15, 1998); ITC Finds Gluten Imports Harm U.S. Industry,
THE FOOD AND FIBER LET-rER (Sparks Cos., Mc Lean, Va.), Feb. 2, 1998, at 3.
152 See GAIT, supra note 11, art. XIX. Unlike the U.S. escape clause, Article
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was reached which imposes limitations on the use of the escape
clause.' The most important change is the creation of an
obligation to negotiate trade compensation with WTO Members
affected by the imposition of a safeguard.' 4  If the Member
imposing the safeguard fails to meet this obligation, it risks
retaliation by affected WTO Members.' Although this obligation
to negotiate does not arise until the import relief has been in place
for three years,5 6 the threat of retaliation makes successful use of
the U.S. escape clause even less likely in the future.
VII. Intellectual Property Protection
A firm in an agricultural industry facing harmful import
competition may have still another avenue of relief depending on
the nature of its product. It is not uncommon for agricultural
products to be the subject of intellectual property protection
including biotechnology patents and trademarks. If a domestic
firm's product has these protections, it should consider pursuing
relief under section 337. 7 Section 337 authorizes the President to
ban the importation of articles which infringe U.S. intellectual
property rights, such as trademarks and trade names, patents, and
copyrights, or which are marketed using unfair practices.' 8 This
law is administered by the ITC through investigations and
exclusion orders, which apply to all imports of the infringing
article regardless of the country of origin."'9
In 1990, a GATT Panel found section 337 to be in violation of
GATT Article 111:4, which requires that imported products be
given treatment no less favorable than like domestic products.' 60
XIX: 1 (a) further requires that the surge in imports result from unforeseen developments
and from obligations incurred under the GATT such as tariff concessions. See id. art.
XIX, para. 1(a).
153 See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 10,
Annex IA.
154 See id. art. 8, para. 1.
155 See id. art. 8, para. 2.
156 See id. art. 8, para. 3.
157 TariffAct of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1994).
158 See id.
159 See 19 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1997).
160 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT
[Vol. 23
1998] U.S. AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM
The statute was subsequently amended to bring it into conformity
with the GATT. 6' The amendments should not reduce the
effectiveness of section 337 in protecting U.S. intellectual property
rights and should remove the international stigma caused by the
panel ruling.'62 Therefore, this may be an effective avenue of relief
for an agricultural industry facing harmful import competition.
VIII. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
A final avenue of relief is available to a domestic industry
when harmful competition is the result of a foreign government's
policies. Section 301 provides an administrative means for a
domestic industry to challenge the laws and practices of foreign
countries that the industry believes are in violation of trade
agreements or are otherwise unjustifiable and burden or restrict
U.S. commerce."' It is generally used as a "crowbar" to challenge
foreign market access restrictions and open foreign markets,'" but
it could be employed to challenge an unfair foreign practice, such
as an export subsidy exceeding a Member's reduction
commitments, that results in a surge of imports into the United
States.'65 Section 301 is administered by the USTR' 66 and usually
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990).
161 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 321, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4943
(1994).
162 See Tom M. Schaumberg, A Revitalized Section 337 to Prohibit Unfairly Traded
Imports, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY RoUND AGREEMENTS ACT, supra
note 93, at 485, 498.
163 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-19 (1994).
164 See Korean Agricultural Market Access Restrictions, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,006 (U.S.
Trade Rep. 1994) (initiation of § 302 investigation which was refiled on July 20, 1995,
60 Fed. Reg. 42,925 (1995)); European Community Banana Import Regime, 59 Fed.
Reg. 53,495 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1994) (initiation of § 302 investigation which was
subsequently terminated, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,027 (1995)); Japanese Varietal Testing and
Quarantine Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,378 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1997) (notification that
United States has requested establishment of a dispute settlement panel under the WTO
Agreement).
165 For example, on September 5, 1997, the National Milk Producers Federation,
the United States Dairy Export Council and the International Dairy Foods Association
filed a petition challenging the Canadian dairy price-pooling system as an export
subsidy circumventing Canada's WTO commitments. See Canadian Export Subsidies
and Market Access for Dairy Products, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,851 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1997)
(initiation of § 302 investigation).
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results in a dispute settlement case being taken to a panel under the
provisions of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement.' 6 If
the panel concludes that the foreign practice violates a provision of
a WTO agreement, the United States can retaliate against imports
from that country by imposing additional import duties.'
68
IX. Conclusion
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture sharply
reduced the ability of the federal government to provide import
protection to domestic farmers and processors of agricultural
commodities. All tariffs for imports have been bound in the U.S.
GATT Schedule of Concessions, import quotas and other non-
tariff barriers have been prohibited, and the use of countervailing
duties to counter foreign domestic subsidies that are exempted
from reductions has been limited. The primary protectionist
measures-tariffs and quotas--have been circumscribed to the
point of rendering them almost unavailable to limit imports from
WTO Members.
Nonetheless, the United States retains the right to modify tariff
bindings, withdraw tariff preferences, impose antidumping and
countervailing duties, and protect patents on agricultural products.
Furthermore, the United States has gained the ability to apply
special price-based or quantity-based safeguards on imports of
agricultural products and has gained greatly improved means of
challenging foreign export subsidies and other practices in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings. These measures should be
demanded more frequently as other protectionist measures are
banned.
On the whole, protectionism has been limited and the potential
for using the remaining means of protection for political purposes
has been curtailed. This was, of course, the intention of both the
negotiators of the Agreement on Agriculture and of Congress
when it approved the Uruguay Round agreements. Agricultural
'6 See 15 C.F.R. pt. 2006 (1997).
167 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 10, Annex 2.
168 See id. art. 22. Article 22 refers to retaliation as the "suspension of
concessions." Id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c) (1994) (granting USTR authority to
retaliate).
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industries hoping to gain relief from imports will be forced to
focus their efforts on the available means and to marshal resources
effectively to secure favorable government actions.

